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Abstract
Analysis of the equity premium puzzle has focused on private sector capital markets. The object of this
paper is to consider the welfare and policy implications of each of the broad classes of explanations of
the equity premium puzzle. As would be expected, the greater the deviation from the ￿rst-best outcome
implied by a given explanation of the equity premium puzzle, the more interventionist are the implied
policy conclusions. Nevertheless, even explanations of the equity premium puzzle consistent with a general
consumption-based asset pricing model have important welfare and policy implications.
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gratefully acknowledges income support from an ARC Federation fellowship.The equity premium puzzle, ￿rst observed by Mehra and Prescott (1985), has given rise to
a large literature. As Mehra and Prescott showed, an application of the standard consumption-
based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) with plausible parameter values implies that the risk
premium associated with the market rate of return to equity, relative to the riskless bond rate,
should be less than half a percentage point compared to actual values of six percentage points or
more observed in the United States and other developed countries over long periods. A closely
related observation is the risk-free rate puzzle (Weil 1992), that is, the fact that the real rate of
returns to bonds is lower than the CCAPM prediction.
In the years immediately following the publication of Mehra and Prescott (1985), a number of
proposed resolutions were discussed and rejected either because they could not be calibrated so as
to ￿t the data or because they broke down when incorporated into a fully intertemporal version
of CCAPM. More recently, the ￿ ow of papers proposing partial or complete resolutions of the
puzzle has exceeded the capacity of the profession to provide critical response, but no explanation
has achieved general acceptance (Mehra 2003, Mehra and Prescott 2003). Calibration exercises
undertaken on models incorporating proposed explanations of the equity premium mostly yield
the result that plausible parameterizations can explain part, but not all, of the observed premium.
Calibrated models that have been claimed to explain the entire premium have generally not
proved robust to modest changes in assumptions. Meanwhile there has been considerable interest
in whether the equity premium has declined in recent years, and, if so, why. (See, for example,
Jagannath, Grattan and Scherbina, 2001, and the references cited therein).
Despite the large and growing theoretical and empirical literature on the equity premium
puzzle, little attention has been paid to the implications of the puzzle for resource allocation,
welfare or policy. Yet the analysis of Mehra and Prescott shows that a crucial price variable, the
price of systematic risk, is an order of magnitude larger than would be expected on the basis of
rational optimization in e¢ cient capital markets. As noted by Campbell and Cochrane (1999),
this implies that the welfare cost of economic ￿ uctuations is considerably greater than would be
suggested on the basis of a standard CCAPM model, such as that considered by Lucas (1987).
It would be surprising if such a discrepancy between the predictions of the standard model
1and reality had no other welfare or policy consequences. In fact, as will be shown below, the
analysis of the equity premium is central to issues as diverse as the desirability of a ￿ Tobin tax￿
on international ￿nancial transactions and the evaluation of public-private partnerships under the
UK government￿ s Private Finance Initiative.
The welfare and policy implications of the equity premium puzzle will depend on the reason for
the divergence between the CCAPM prediction derived by Mehra and Prescott and the observed
value of the equity premium. Three broad classes of explanations of the equity premium and
risk-free rate puzzles have been o⁄ered. First, there are explanations that retain the hypothesis
of rational optimization in e¢ cient capital markets, but rely on preference structures or beliefs
about the distribution of equity returns that di⁄er from those employed by Mehra and Prescott.
Second, there are explanations that rely on some form of error or misperception by investors.
Third, there are explanations that invoke some form of capital market failure (relative to the
CCAPM assumption of costless and complete state-contingent markets).
The object of the present paper is to consider the implications of each of these broad classes of
explanations of the equity premium puzzle for resource allocation, welfare and policy. As would
be expected, the greater the deviation from the ￿rst-best outcome implied by a given explanation
of the equity premium puzzle, the more interventionist are the implied policy conclusions. Never-
theless, even explanations of the equity premium puzzle consistent with a general CCAPM have
important welfare and policy implications.
1 Explanations of the equity premium puzzle
Long data series generally show that the rate of return to buying and holding the market portfolio
of stocks is considerably greater than the rate of return to government bonds. For example, Mehra
and Prescott (1985) present data showing that over the period 1889￿ 1978, the average annual yield
on the Standard and Poors 500 Index was seven per cent, while the average yield on short-term
debt was less than one per cent. The di⁄erence of around six percentage points, is referred to as
the equity premium.
2By contrast, economic analysis based on standard models of capital markets and risk prefer-
ences, such as CCAPM, suggests that the equity premium should be small, in most cases, less
than half a percentage point. The gap between the observed value of the equity premium and the
value predicted by CCAPM and similar models is referred to as the ￿ equity premium puzzle￿ .
The equity premium is a puzzle because, in CCAPM, the equity premium is derived from risk-
aversion with respect to systematic risk, that is, the correlation between returns to equity and
aggregate consumption. Since aggregate consumption is quite stable (its coe¢ cient of variation
is about 3 per cent) and people appear to be only moderately risk averse, the risk premium
should also be small. This argument was ￿rst developed by Mehra and Prescott, and is presented
with slightly di⁄erent formulations in the survey articles by Kocherlakota, Mehra and Mehra and
Prescott.
Mehra and Prescott￿ s characterization of the anomalously large equity premium as a ￿ puzzle￿
had a signi￿cant impact on the direction taken by the subsequent literature. The core research
problem was presented as one of ￿nding a satisfactory solution to the puzzle, that is, a model in
which the predicted values of the equity premium and asset prices more generally matched the
stylized facts noted by Mehra and Prescott. By contrast, less attention was paid to implications
of the anomalous equity premium for resource allocation and for economic policy. To address the
latter question, it is necessary to impose some order on the profusion of ￿ explanations￿that have
been o⁄ered as resolutions of the equity premium puzzle, by classifying them into a small number
of classes. The implications of each class of explanation for resource allocation and public policy
may then be considered.
A useful starting point is given by the surveys by Kocherlakota (1996), Mehra (2003) and Mehra
and Prescott (2003). We exclude from consideration some proposed resolutions that are rejected
by these authors on grounds that appear convincing, including the survivor bias hypotheses of
Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) and the ￿ disaster states￿hypothesis of Rietz (1988) but include
a number of ideas not discussed in other survivors, notably including non-optimizing models of
behavior.
31.1 Individual characteristics
1.1.1 CCAPM-based explanations of the equity premium
In some sense, the most complete resolution of the equity premium paradox would be one which
showed that the CCAPM is valid, even though the formulation used by Mehra and Prescott is
not. The simplest explanation of the equity premium, consistent with rational optimization and
e¢ cient markets, is that the representative consumer is much more risk-averse than is normally
supposed. This explanation has not found much support in view of extensive evidence supporting
the view that the typical coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is close to 1. Nevertheless, this simple
explanation has considerable heuristic value in illustrating the welfare and policy implications (if
any) of the equity premium.
More plausible CCAPM-based resolutions of the equity premium puzzle include models of
preferences with habit persistence (Constantinides 1990, Campbell and Cochrane 1999) or depen-
dence on previous peak consumption (an idea ￿rst put forward by Duesenberry in the context
of the debate over the Keynesian consumption function). Similarly, by relaxing the assumption
of expected-utility maximization, Epstein and Zin (1990) can account for a large risk premium
without necessarily requiring a correspondingly low degree of intertemporal substitution, but this
again con￿ icts with evidence of risk-attitudes in other markets which point to much less aversion
to risk.
The most important characteristic of this class of resolutions of the equity premium puzzle is
that, if systematic risk in the economy arises from inherent features of the underlying technology,
as in standard real business cycle models, the observed set of asset prices represents a ￿rst-
best welfare outcome. Hence, any welfare or policy implications must arise as a result of the
interaction between capital markets and failures in other markets. Nevertheless, intuitions about
resource allocation derived, implicitly or explicitly, from the standard CCAPM may be seriously
misleading.
In positive terms, explanations based on habit persistence or similar characteristics of prefer-
ences imply that short-run and long-run responses to relative price changes should be signi￿cantly
4di⁄erent. Indeed as Otrok, Ravikumar and Whiteman (2002) emphasize, agents whose preferences
exhibit habit persistence care not only about the overall volatility of consumption but also its tem-
poral distribution. Speci￿cally, habit persistence implies much more aversion to high-frequency
￿ uctuations than to low-frequency ￿ uctuations in consumption. They demonstrate that a rela-
tively small amount of high-frequency volatility in consumption can generate a large equity pre-
mium in the habit persistence model. However, they caution against such models being accepted
as a complete resolution of the puzzle, since they ￿nd when compared to the actual changes in the
characteristics of the frequency of volatility in US consumption over the past one-hundred years,
the model￿ s predictions for the changes in the equity premium (and risk-free rate) are essentially
and signi￿cantly in the opposite direction to the observed changes.
1.1.2 Relaxation of the optimization assumptions
The standard CCAPM model represents consumers as continuously-optimizing dynamically-consistent
expected-utility maximizers. These assumptions provide a tight link between attitudes to risk and
attitudes to variations in intertemporal consumption. As noted above, this link may be weakened
by assuming habit persistence in consumption preferences. A similar e⁄ect may be obtained by
weakening the assumption of continuous optimization, for example by supposing that consumers
adopt satis￿cing rules rather than fully optimizing.
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) propose an explanation they dub myopic loss aversion based on
Kahneman and Tversky￿ s (1979, 1984) two concepts of ￿loss aversion￿ (the tendency for indi-
viduals to be more sensitive to ￿losses￿than to ￿gains￿ ) and ￿mental accounting￿(the myopic
heuristics people use to organize and evaluate their ￿nancial positions). Assuming investors are
myopic loss averters and adjust their portfolios frequently, Benartzi and Thaler show through their
simulations that the size of the equity premium is consistent with previously estimated parameters
of Kahneman and Tversky￿ s (1979) prospect theory, if investors evaluate their portfolios annually.
Myopic loss aversion has also received some experimental support in Thaler et al. (1977) and
more recently in Gneezy et al.(2003). In the latter paper, the ￿ market prices￿of risky assets that
arose in the various treatments were signi￿cantly higher when the feedback frequency and decision
5￿ exibility were reduced.
Gabaix and Laibson (2001), on the other hand, argue that delays in adjusting consumption to
take account of changes in returns to equity may lead to short-term behavior that is apparently
highly risk-averse, even though the actual coe¢ cient of risk aversion may be quite low.
In predictive terms, both of these alternative relaxations of fully rational decision-makers yield
results quite similar to those obtained by Constantinides (1990). The most important distinction
is that welfare analysis based on the assumption of perfect optimization may not be applicable
in these models. In particular, even though the divergence from full optimization may appear
small, the resulting individual welfare loss will in general be large, since observed portfolio choices
yield returns well below those of the portfolio that would be chosen by a moderately risk-averse
continuously-optimizing investor.
1.1.3 Error-based explanations
There has been no general acceptance of attempts to resolve the equity premium paradox while
maintaining the hypothesis that individuals rationally optimize according to preferences that are,
at least approximately, consistent with the assumptions of the CCAPM model. A plausible infer-
ence is that some or all individuals diverge substantially, and systematically, from the rationality
assumptions of the CCAPM model. This inference leads to ￿ error-based￿explanations of the equity
premium puzzle.
The simplest error-based explanation of the equity premium, put forward by Glassman and
Hassett (1999) is that investors, and ￿ expert￿advisors, have misperceived the riskiness of equity
by confusing short-term volatility with long-term risk. Glassman and Hassett argue that investors
are gradually realizing that equity investments guarantee higher long-term returns with little
additional risk. As they do so, the equity premium is declining. Glassman and Hassett estimate
that the elimination of the equity premium would raise the price of equity by a factor of four.
Since the Dow Jones index stood at 9000 when their initial estimate was made, this calculation
implied the title of their bestselling book Dow 36000. Hence, their analysis implies that investors
6can still make substantial pro￿ts by anticipating this adjustment.1
De Long et al. (1990), drawing on the work of Shiller (1989), put forward a model in which
risk over and above that due to the dividend-generating process is introduced into the economy by
the mistaken, and stochastic, beliefs of noise traders, giving rise to an equity premium. A broadly
similar model is presented by Cecchetti et al.(2000)
1.2 Equity characteristics explanations
A second class of explanations focuses on characteristics of equity not captured by standard capital
market models, but nonetheless consistent with rational optimization by investors in smoothly
functioning markets.
Principal-agent problems and the corporation The most important characteristic of equity
that is not fully taken into account in standard asset pricing models is the fact that equity holders
must elect managers and monitor their activities. Thus, there is a principal-agent relationship
between the managers of corporations and the holders of equities.
In most cases, it is prohibitively costly for individual investors to closely monitor the activities
of the corporations in which they invest. Hence, investors must rely either on external auditors
and regulators or on the strong e¢ cient market hypothesis that equity markets fully reveal even
private information about asset values. The most relevant version of the latter hypothesis is that
based on the idea that an uninformed investor can guarantee receipt of average market returns by
investing in the market portfolio. The question of whether it is possible for an uninformed investor
to identify the market portfolio is an open one. However, to explain the equity premium, it is only
necessary to postulate that potential investors do not believe they can match the performance of
the market.
Liquidity An alternative explanation based on characteristics of equity is put forward by writers
including Bansal and Coleman (1996), Palomino (1996), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Swan
(2000) who focus on the demand for liquidity. Swan argues that although equity holders gain
1 Glassman and Hassett take no account of the risk-free rate puzzle. Presumably part of the equilibrating
adjustment would take the form of an increase in the riskless interest rate.
7utility from frequent trade, they must be compensated, through a higher rate of return, for the
transactions costs associated with equity trades.
Palomino (1996) shows that in a noise trader model with imperfect competition, the ￿ thinner￿
(in terms of the number of active traders) is the market for equities, the lower is its equilibrium
price and hence the higher is the expected premium over the competitively priced risk-free bond.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) develop an alternative role for liquidity in a model in which ￿rms
facing aggregate uncertainty over their liquidity needs are willing to pay a premium for Treasury
bonds over private claims.
Tax distortions McGrattan and Prescott (2001) argue that the observed equity premium in
the United States since 1945 may be explained by changes in the tax treatment of interest and
dividend income. As Mehra (2003) notes, there are some di¢ culties in the calibration used in this
analysis and the existence of a substantial equity premium before 1945 is left unexplained. Also
as noted by Mehra, the premium for equity obtained in this way is not a risk premium, which
is problematic in view of the relatively good performance of models like CAPM that yield high
estimates of the risk premium. Nevertheless, the general observation that frictions arising from
taxes and other distortions need to be taken into account in explaining the equity premium is an
important one.
1.3 Market failure explanations
Two broad classes of market failure have been considered as explanations of the equity premium.
First, problems of adverse selection and moral hazard may result in the absence of markets in
which individuals can insure themselves against systematic risk in labor income and noncorporate
pro￿ts. Second, transactions costs or liquidity constraints may prevent individuals from smoothing
consumption over time.
Kocherlakota rejects explanations of the equity premium based on the absence of insurance
markets, arguing that individuals could overcome the consequences of uninsurable risk by bor-
rowing and lending to smooth consumption over time. It seems plausible, however, that a model
incorporating both the absence of contemporaneous insurance markets and constraints on in-
8tertemporal consumption smoothing would be consistent with the observed behavior of asset
prices.
1.3.1 Insurance market failures
Mankiw (1986) and Weil (1992) argue that the presence of this uninsurable background risk may
reduce willingness to hold additional systematic risk in the form of equity and thereby account
for an equity premium. Mankiw stresses the point that, ex post, systematic risk is concentrated
on the relatively small group in the population who incur unemployment or business failure. If
individuals dislike negatively skewed returns (that is, in expected-utility terms, if they display
prudence, so that u000 > 0); then the equilibrium risk premium will be higher when ex post risk is
concentrated on a subset of the population.
In Weil￿ s model, individuals who are making their portfolio decisions are ex ante identical in
terms of the distribution of risks that they face. But the risk associated with their labor income
is assumed to be idiosyncratic and uninsurable. Equity pays out a dividend that is assumed to be
independently distributed to an individual￿ s labor income. If they lack the ability to pool their
labor income, individuals are more adverse to holding equity. Weil shows that the relative price
of equity to bonds is smaller when individuals cannot pool their labor income risk. Moreover, the
absolute price of bonds is higher, implying a lower return risk-free rate. That is, undiversi￿able or
uninsurable background risk both increases the (relative) equity premium and reduces the risk-free
rate.2
1.3.2 Constraints on intertemporal consumption smoothing
Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002) present an overlapping generations model, with
three generations, in which the young, who have limited ￿nancial resources of their own, and who
would otherwise issue debt and purchase equity, are constrained from borrowing. The old wish to
sell their entire portfolio to ￿nance their consumption, which only leaves the middle-aged to hold
both equity and the positive net supply of bonds. At given asset prices, this depresses demand
2 More precisely, Weil (1982) proves that both E[(1 + r + ￿)=(1 + r)] and E[r] increase when individuals are
unable to pool their labor income. As Grant and Quiggin (2000) observe, this is not the same as proving that E[￿]
must increase. They provide an example with constant relative risk averse preferences where E[￿] decreases.
9for equity and raises the demand for bonds. Hence, both a higher bond price (implying a lower
risk-free rate) and a larger equity premium are required for equilibrium in this economy compared
to unconstrained economy in which young do not face borrowing constraints.
2 Implications for resource allocation
2.1 The economic cost of risk
The most direct and obvious implication of a large risk premium for equity is that the economic
cost of the systematic risk in returns to equity is also large. This is also the only implication
of the equity premium that has received extensive discussion. Responding to the argument of
Lucas (1987) that the standard CCAPM model yields very small estimates of the welfare cost of
economic ￿ uctuations, particularly when compared to the bene￿ts of economic growth, Campbell
and Cochrane observe that, in a model that generates values of the equity premium consistent
with observed asset prices, the welfare costs of systematic risk are comparable in magnitude to
the welfare bene￿ts of economic growth. Although this result is model-speci￿c, the general point
that a large risk premium for equity implies a large welfare cost in any model where asset prices
re￿ ect preferences (Atkeson and Phelan 1994).
For illustrative purposes, we will assume, conservatively, that the real bond rate is 2 per cent
and that the expected return to the market portfolio is 8 per cent, so that the equity premium is
6 percentage points. It follows that any stationary stream of returns to equity with the same risk
characteristics as the market portfolio has a market value one-quarter of that of a similar stream
of returns with no systematic risk. Equivalently, in ￿ ow terms, the welfare cost of systematic
risk in equity returns, evaluated at prevailing market prices, is equal to three-quarters of the
value of corporate pro￿ts, or around 15 per cent of GDP, assuming a pro￿t share of 20 per
cent. Presumably, if risk were reduced, the equity premium would also decline, implying that the
counterfactual of a complete elimination of systematic risk in equity returns would raise welfare
by less than 15 per cent. Nevertheless, the impact is large.
Assuming that equity is completely characterized by its state-contingent distribution of returns,
this result follows directly from the existence of the equity premium, whether or not the premium
10re￿ ects market failure or incomplete optimization. However, if the premium arises from other
characteristics of equity, such as illiquidity or principal-agent problems, returns to equity cannot
be used to determine the economic cost of risk.
The implications for the economic costs of risk may also be considered in state-contingent
terms. In the simplest possible model, there are two states of nature, normal and recession. We
think of a bond as a state-contingent security yielding a (normalized) unit return in both states
of nature and a unit of equity as a security that also yields a unit return in the normal state but
yields a lower return k in the recession nature. We calibrate the model in order to match the
stylized facts regarding the rates of return to bonds (0.02) and equity (0.08), and the standard
deviation of return to equity (0.2).
In this framework, the state-contingent price of income in the recession state (expressed in
terms of state-independent income claims) must satisfy
q ￿ p = (1 ￿ k)pr;
where q is the price of a bond, p is the price of equity and pr is the marginal value of recession-state
income.
Let ￿ denote the probability of the recession state. The rates of return to debt and equity are
given by
r = 1=q and
￿ = ((1 ￿ ￿) + ￿k)=p,
respectively, and the standard deviation of risky equity returns is given by
￿ =
p
(1 ￿ k)2[￿(1 ￿ ￿)]=p2.
If we assume ￿ = 0:1, we can solve these four equations for the unknowns p;q; k and pr: With the
stated parameters, we obtain q = 50, p = 6:8 , k = ￿3:5 and pr = 9:6. Hence pn, the marginal
value of normal-state income is equal to q ￿ pr = 40:4. The probability-adjusted relative price of







11That is, at the margin, an increase in income of one unit in the recession state, would be exactly
o⁄set by a reduction in income of 2.1 units in the normal state. Equivalently, relative to the
contributions to expected income, marginal income units in a recession year are worth around
twice as much as marginal income units in a normal year.
2.2 Individual portfolio decisions
There is a large, and in￿ uential, popular literature dealing with the implications of the equity
premium for individual portfolio decisions. The predominant tone of this literature has been
￿ bullish￿ , presenting the argument that the historically high rates of return to equity are evidence
of excessive or misplaced risk-aversion, and that long-term investors can earn high returns, with
little or no risk, by switching to stocks from bonds and other assets. A notable contribution is
that of Glassman and Hassett (1999), who argued that the correction of erroneous beliefs would
lead to a fourfold increase in the value of stocks, raising the Dow Jones index from 9000 to 36000.
The contrary view has been presented most prominently by Shiller (2000). Shiller begins by
noting that the central thesis of Glassman and Hassett was almost universally accepted by the late
1990s. Shiller quotes a survey, conducted in 1999, in which 96 per cent of respondents agreed with
the statement ￿ The stock market is the best investment for long-term holders who can just buy
and hold through the ups and downs of the market￿ , with 76 per cent indicating strong agreement
and only 2 per cent disagreeing.
Shiller does not o⁄er an explicit explanation for the equity premium. However, in view of
his earlier work on the excess volatility of stock prices, it is natural to link his analysis with a
￿ noise trader￿model like that of De Long et al. (1990). In these models, it is possible for well-
informed rational investors to make positive expected pro￿ts by exploiting the erroneous beliefs
of noise traders. Faced with a bubble such as that of 1996￿ 2000, Shiller advises rational investors
(presumably those lacking the deep pockets required for short-selling) to remain on the sidelines,
and hold a substantial portion of wealth in assets other than equity.
Both the Shiller and Glassman￿ Hassett models are based on market ine¢ ciencies arising from
persistent error on the part of some market participants. It follows that rewards will accrue to
12investors who can identify and exploit the prevalent patterns of error. By contrast, explanations
of the equity premium that are consistent with the e¢ cient market hypothesis yield no guidance
with respect to portfolio choices. By de￿nition, any available information about market behavior
is already re￿ ected in the prices generated by an e¢ cient market.
The same appears to be true of market failure and transaction-costs models, in which the prices
generated by equity markets are typically assumed to eliminate any opportunities for arbitrage,
when information constraints and transactions costs are taken into account.
2.3 ￿ Short-termism￿
In the 1980s and early 1990s, there was vigorous debate over claims that the dominant role
of stock markets in investment decision-making in English-speaking countries generates a bias
towards investments with a ￿ short-term￿bias. By contrast, it was claimed Japanese and European
￿nancial systems, in which banks played a more active role, resulted in a greater supply of ￿ patient
capital￿ . Interest in the ￿ short-termism￿debate receded in response to the strong growth in output
and investment in the United States in the late 1990s, and the poor performance of the Japanese
economy over the same period, but many of the issues remained unresolved.
An in￿ uential case in support of the short-termism thesis was put forward by Porter (1990,
1992), while opposing views were argued by Jensen (1986) and Marsh (1990). Most theoretical
discussion of the problem focused on informational asymmetries between investors and corporate
managers (Naranayan 1985, Shleifer and Vishny 1990). However, as Miles (1993) observes, the
problem of short-term bias is related to (though not identical to) the equity premium puzzle.
Supposing that the risk characteristics of ￿rms are stable and that cash ￿ ows follow a di⁄usion
process with the conditional variance of ￿ ows proportional to their maturity, the CAPM model
implies that any enterprise i can be valued by discounting its cash ￿ ow using a risk-adjusted
discount rate ri = r+￿￿ where ￿ measures the covariability of returns with the market portfolio.
Hence, the larger is ￿; the larger is ri and the shorter is the corresponding value of the ￿ payback
period￿commonly used in project evaluation (if mean cash ￿ ows are constant, the payback period
is 1
ri):
13Particular explanations of the equity premium puzzle may also imply the existence of system-
atic deviations from CAPM valuations for a given value of the equity premium ￿. For example, if
investors misperceive the riskiness of longer-term investments (say those with returns more than
￿ve years in the future) this will be re￿ ected in an equity premium that is disproportionately large
for ￿rms undertaking such investments. Miles (1993) ￿nds evidence of such a pattern.
Models based on capital market failure may also imply systematic deviations from CAPM
valuations. For example, if individuals are con￿dent about short-term macroeconomic conditions,
but uncertain about conditions in the medium and longer term, their inability to insure against
the consequences of recession would be re￿ ected in a short-term bias, relative to the predictions
of a CAPM model.
2.4 Trends in the equity premium
A number of writers have suggested that the equity premium has declined, or even disappeared, in
recent years (Jagannath, Grattan and Scherbina 2001). This claim is obviously consistent with the
view of Glassman and Hassett (1999) that the equity premium arose from errors which are being
corrected over time. A number of other proposed explanations of the equity premium puzzle yield
a similar prediction, given appropriate auxiliary hypotheses. For example, if transactions costs in
securities markets are declining as a result of deregulation or technological progress, models based
on liquidity costs or market frictions imply that the equity premium should decline. As noted by
McGrattan and Prescott (2001), a declining trend in taxes should produce a temporary equity
premium which will ultimately disappear. Similarly, if transactions costs in markets for insurance
and intertemporal consumption smoothing are falling, market failure explanations are consistent
with a declining equity premium. It seems clear that transactions costs in securities markets have
declined, as have taxes on capital income. It is less clear that the costs of personal insurance and
consumption-smoothing transactions have fallen.
By contrast, explanations of the equity premium based on individual characteristics such as
loss aversion or habit persistence give no reason for predicting a trend in the equity premium. In
general, it would be expected that the distribution of such characteristics in the population would
14be broadly stable over time.
Finally, ￿ noise trader￿models predict a cyclical equity premium which declines in periods when
noise traders are excessively optimistic, and increases when optimism is replaced by pessimism.
On this view, the decline of the equity premium since 1980 would be seen as the product of a
temporary bubble in stock prices.
3 Welfare and policy implications
3.1 Recessions and ￿scal policy
Perhaps the most important and robust welfare and policy implication of resolutions of the equity
premium puzzle is that the welfare cost of recessions is large, even if the long-term growth rate
of aggregate consumption is una⁄ected. This result may be contrasted with the analysis of Lucas
(1987) who shows that, in an expected-utility model, the welfare cost of variance in aggregated
consumption is trivial.
This is true whether the explanation of the equity premium puzzle is based on market failures,
on mistakes or on high e⁄ective risk-aversion. The crucial observation is that the risk premium
associated with the market portfolio is determined by the relative prices of claims on income in
recession and non-recession states. The larger the risk premium, the larger the marginal value of
recession-state income and the greater the welfare cost of recessions. The calculations presented
above provide one approach to quantifying these impacts.
This result has obvious implications for the calculation of optimal ￿ sacri￿ce ratios￿ , that is,
marginal-tradeo⁄s between output loss and reductions in in￿ ation. There are also implications
for policies such as microeconomic reform, which promise long-term gain (higher productivity)
in return for short-term pain (adjustment costs). There has been a long-standing debate over
whether such policies should be pursued during periods of recession. The analysis above suggests
that, other things being equal, it is preferable not to incur transaction costs during recessions, but
to defer them to periods of normal activity. The analysis also provides a way of quantifying some
of the relevant trade-o⁄s.
153.2 Social security
Although the welfare and policy implications of the equity premium puzzle have received little
systematic attention, the divergence between expected rates of return to equity and to debt has
in￿ uenced a number of contributors to the debate over reform of Social Security in the United
States. This debate has been prompted in part by the observation that, under the existing pay-
as-you-go arrangements, the retirement of the baby boom generation will lead to a requirement
to supplement the Social Security fund from general revenue. Two suggestions based on the ob-
served equity premium have attracted particular attention. The Clinton administration proposed
a diversi￿cation of the investments of the Social Security trust fund. A committee appointed by
the Bush administration has advocated the establishment of individualized accounts which would
allow each person paying into social security to decide on the investment portfolio for part of their
contributions. Their own future social security entitlements would then be based partly on the
performance of their individual accounts. Notice that both proposals involve social security contri-
butions being invested in equity as well as (government-issued) debt but the former scheme pools
the returns while in the latter scheme individuals face the risk of their own investment strategy.
Grant and Quiggin (2002) show that the market failure explanations of the equity premium
puzzle proposed by Mankiw (1986) and Weil (1992) imply that welfare would be improved by a
Clinton-style diversi￿cation of the investment policy of the Social Security fund to include equity
as well as debt. But in their model no such bene￿t would arise from individualized accounts,
since the portfolio choices made by individuals for their social security accounts would be o⁄set
by the reallocation of their privately-held assets. This reallocation would leave the equilibrium
contingent consumption of individuals unchanged.
It should be emphasized that the bene￿t that Grant and Quiggin identify is not the result of
higher expected returns from equity. Indeed, the government￿ s purchase of equity arising from the
diversi￿cation of the social security trust fund would increase equity prices and reduce expected
returns. Rather it arises from the fact that the government has the power to levy taxes in the future
to meet any obligation it has to make any speci￿c de￿ned payment in the future. Hence when the
government invests in equity today, in states of the world tomorrow where equity returns are high,
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while in bad states where the equity returns are poor, taxes need to be raised. In an economy
where individuals face undiversi￿able risk associated with adverse selection problems, and where
taxes are proportional or progressive, this means that from the perspective of an individual today,
the spread of the distribution of his or her after-tax income has been increased for a boom event
in the future but reduced for a recession event. In conjunction with the usual assumption that
agents exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, Grant and Quiggin show that ex ante welfare is
increased since, in utility terms, the loss from the given increase in risk at higher incomes is lower
than the gain from reducing risk at lower levels of income.
A welfare improvement will also arise under the hypothesis that the equity premium arises
from a mistaken perception of the riskiness of equity, provided that this misperception does not
extend to the indirect holdings of equity arising from the changed investment policy of the Social
Security fund. Assuming that individuals disregard risk associated with possible variations in
tax rates associated with ￿ uctuations in equity (correctly, since the risk is small relative to total
income) but overestimate the risk associated with personal holdings of equity, an increase in the
expected returns to the investments of the Social Security fund will be treated as equivalent to a
reduction in the expected future taxes needed to meet unfunded liabilities.
Similar arguments apply with respect to explanations of the equity premium based on undesir-
able characteristics of equity as an asset. Supposing, for example, that the equity premium arises
from the superior liquidity of debt, as in Swan (2000), and that the liquidity or otherwise of the
Social Security fund investment portfolio is not a matter of concern, a shift in the holdings of the
Social Security fund from debt to equity is equivalent to an increase in the supply of liquidity, and
therefore generates a welfare bene￿t.
By contrast, under CCAPM-based explanations of the equity premium puzzle, and assuming
that investors are well-informed, changes in the investment policy of the Social Security fund will
be negated by o⁄setting changes in individual asset demands (Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes,
1998).
173.3 Public investment and privatization
The issue of risk premiums and their implications for public and private investment was debated
during the 1960s and 1970s. Hirshleifer (1964) argued that the use of the risk-free rate to discount
the returns of public projects would lead to the displacement of superior private projects. On
the other hand, Arrow and Lind (1970), argued that, because the public sector had a superior
capacity to spread risk, the value of a risky project was greater under public ownership than under
private ownership and rea¢ rmed the view that bene￿t￿ cost analysis for public projects should be
conducted using the riskless rate of discount.
The formal argument of Arrow and Lind (1970) showed that there should be no risk premium
for public investment in a small project with returns uncorrelated with aggregate income. More
signi￿cantly, in their policy discussion, Arrow and Lind implicitly assumed the central results of
Mehra and Prescott (1985), namely that, under standard assumptions, the risk premium associated
with perfect diversi￿cation of all risks in the economy would be close to zero but that the risk
premium actually required for private equity investment was large. By contrast, in the absence
of explicit estimates of the optimal risk premium, critics of the Arrow￿ Lind proposition, such as
Hirshleifer (1989) began from the presumption that capital markets operated e¢ ciently to spread
risk. This led to the conclusion that the market-determined price of systematic risk was socially
optimal and should be used in the evaluation of public projects.
This issue is of considerable policy relevance in the light of widespread use of a ￿ public sector
comparator￿in the evaluation of public-private partnerships proposed under the Private Finance
Initiative in the United Kingdom and similar schemes. The use of the CAPM model to evaluate
the risk borne by the public sector comparator has been the subject of considerable controversy
(see for example, Mayston 1999, O¢ cer 1999 and Quiggin 1999).
Reconsideration of the debate in the light of the literature on the equity premium paradox
clari￿es a number of points. Under the standard CCAPM assumptions, including perfect capital
markets, the optimal rate of discount for public projects will be close to the riskless rate (as
claimed by Arrow and Lind) and equal to the discount rate for private projects with similar risk
characteristics (as claimed by Hirshleifer). The central disagreement between the two sides rests
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and Prescott could be applied to yield the optimal rate of discount for public projects, Hirshleifer
and other critics of Arrow and Lind implicitly assumed that the observed cost of capital for private
￿rms was consistent with CCAPM.
Thus, the Arrow￿ Lind argument relies implicitly on the existence of a market failure, but Arrow
and Lind (1970) do not specify how the market failure arises. If risk-spreading through the tax
system is to correct the market failure, it is important to focus on problems arising from adverse
selection rather than moral hazard. Since taxation is not voluntary, tax policies can overcome
adverse selection problems. However, moral hazard problems based on unobservable e⁄ort cannot
be overcome through tax policy.
Grant and Quiggin (2003a) show that, if adverse selection problems prevent insurance against
systematic risk, as in Mankiw (1986), the optimal rate of return for public projects will be less
than the market rate for projects with similar risk characteristics. Grant and Quiggin consider
the case where the public sector has available a menu of projects arranged in decreasing order of
attractiveness relative to the market portfolio. They show that, for the marginal project, the rate
of return will be greater than the riskless bond rate but less than the private-sector rate of return.
The Arrow￿ Lind proposition is also valid if the equity premium arises from characteristics of
equity not incorporated in the standard CCAPM model. This point is most evident in the model
of Swan (2000) where the equity premium arises from transactions costs associated with trade in
imperfectly liquid equity. In this model, asset prices are determined optimally and the real bond
rate is equal to the social opportunity cost of capital. By virtue of its superior ability to issue a
liquid security the government enjoys a cost advantage relative to issuers of private equity. Hence,
the appropriate rate of discount for public projects is the bond rate.
The case where the equity premium arises from errors raises some di¢ culties in welfare analysis.
If, as Shiller (1989) argues, ￿nancial markets display excess volatility, then returns to holdings
of equity are riskier than are the associated streams of corporate pro￿ts. Shiller￿ s insight has
been formalized in the ￿ noise trader￿model of De Long et al. (1990). In this model, risk over and
above that due to the dividend-generating process is introduced into the economy by the distorted
19and stochastic beliefs of noise traders. De Long et al. observe that this excess risk implies an
increase in the equity premium relative to the case when all investors have rational expectations,
and they show that, although both noise traders and sophisticated investors are made better o⁄in
ex ante terms (given their beliefs) by the availability of trade, this apparent welfare improvement
arises at the expense of those holding equity when trade is introduced, such as entrepreneurs
making initial public o⁄erings or governments privatizing publicly owned assets. With regard to
a privatization program, if the equity premium arises from the mistaken beliefs of noise traders,
then as Grant and Quiggin (2003b) show the privatization may reduce public sector net worth.
Moreover, evaluated in terms of the correct beliefs of sophisticated investors, there is a reduction
in social welfare associated with privatization that must be balanced against any improvements
in operating e¢ ciency.
3.4 Tobin taxes
The proposal of Tobin for a tax on international ￿nancial transactions, designed to reduce the
volatility of exchange rates and facilitate macroeconomic management has attracted considerable
attention (see for example, ul Haq, Kaul and Grunberg, 1996). Stiglitz (1992) has presented similar
arguments for taxes on domestic asset market transactions. Given the possibility of arbitrage, it
seems likely that any practical proposal would require both international and domestic transactions
to be taxed at the same rate.
As Palley (1999) observes, a noise trader model implies that taxes should reduce volatility and
increase welfare (on average, given correct beliefs). Empirical tests are di¢ cult since removal of
taxes also increases the equilibrium price of equity directly for any positive level of turnover, so
would want to use revenue to reduce taxes on pro￿ts. By contrast, Swan (2000) argues that, in a
liquidity model, taxes on transactions will reduce welfare. Since the equity premium in models of
this kind is generated by transactions costs, this claim appears plausible.
4 Concluding comments
The CCAPM is a powerful and intuitively appealing model of asset price determination, based
on assumptions which seem to correspond reasonable well to reality. No-one would suppose that
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is not perfectly additively separable over time, there are costs associated with a range of ￿nancial
transactions, some risks are uninsurable and so on. Applications of the model have proceeded
on the basis of the standard methodological presumption that none of these violations of the
assumptions are individually large enough to render the model inapplicable or to induce large
biases in its predictions, and that taken collectively, a large number of independent violations of
the model assumptions will approximately cancel out.
As far as relative asset prices are concerned, the standard presumption appears to be accurate.
The CCAPM is widely employed and seems to work reasonably well in practice. By contrast, the
equity premium puzzle shows that, using standard parameters and a standard model setup, the
CCAPM prediction of the premium associated with systematic risk is out by an order of magnitude.
The development of the subsequent literature indicates that ￿ resolutions￿of the CCAPM based
on changes in a single parameter or modelling assumption have not resolved the puzzle to the
satisfaction of the economics profession.
It seems reasonable to infer that the violation of the CCAPM predictions re￿ ects two problems.
First, most violations of the assumptions underlying the CCAPM tend to raise rather than lower
the equity premium. Second, there are positive interaction e⁄ects, such that the combined impact
of multiple violations of the assumptions is greater than the individual impact of any one viola-
tion. In retrospect, this is not surprising. Equity markets are social contrivances for spreading
risk. The assumptions of costless transactions, complete state-contingent markets and additive
expected-utility preferences are particularly favorable to risk-spreading. A model based on these
assumptions is therefore likely to yield lower estimates of the market price of risk-bearing than
more complex and realistic models.
Given that the resolution of the equity premium puzzle is likely to involve interactions between
a number of deviations from the assumptions of the CCAPM model, assessment of the welfare and
policy implications of the puzzle raises some signi￿cant di¢ culties. The most robust implications
of the equity premium puzzle are those that ￿ ow directly from the high price of systematic risk and
are therefore independent of the resolution of the puzzle. For example, there can be little doubt
21that the existence of a large equity premium strengthens the case for macroeconomic stabilization
policy. Issues relating to the cost of capital for the public sector, including social security policy
and the analysis of privatization, are more complex. To the extent that the equity premium is
generated by factors that do not a⁄ect the government, such as adverse selection problems and
costs associated with ￿nancial transactions, it seems reasonable to infer that the cost of capital
will be close to the rate predicted by CCAPM, and therefore close to the real bond rate. On the
other hand, if the equity premium is consistent with a modi￿ed CCAPM, or arises from problems
that also apply in the public sector, the public cost of capital will be close to the corporate cost.
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